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Abstract
As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle show, applying conditioning to up-
date a probability distribution on a “naive space”, which does not take into account
the protocol used, can often lead to counterintuitive results. Here we examine why.
A criterion known as CAR (“coarsening at random”) in the statistical literature
characterizes when “naive” conditioning in a naive space works. We show that
the CAR condition holds rather infrequently, and we provide a procedural char-
acterization of it, by giving a randomized algorithm that generates all and only
distributions for which CAR holds. This substantially extends previous charac-
terizations of CAR. We also consider more generalized notions of update such as
Jeffrey conditioning and minimizing relative entropy (MRE). We give a general-
ization of the CAR condition that characterizes when Jeffrey conditioning leads to
appropriate answers, and show that there exist some very simple settings in which
MRE essentially never gives the right results. This generalizes and interconnects
previous results obtained in the literature on CAR and MRE.
1 Introduction
Suppose an agent represents her uncertainty about a domain using a probability distribu-
tion. At some point, she receives some new information about the domain. How should
she update her distribution in the light of this information? Conditioning is by far the
most common method in case the information comes in the form of an event. However,
there are numerous well-known examples showing that naive conditioning can lead to
problems. We give just two of them here.
Example 1.1: The Monty Hall puzzle [Mosteller 1965; vos Savant 1990]: Suppose that
you’re on a game show and given a choice of three doors. Behind one is a car; behind
the others are goats. You pick door 1. Before opening door 1, Monty Hall, the host (who
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knows what is behind each door) opens door 3, which has a goat. He then asks you if you
still want to take what’s behind door 1, or to take what’s behind door 2 instead. Should
you switch? Assuming that, initially, the car was equally likely to be behind each of the
doors, naive conditioning suggests that, given that it is not behind door 3, it is equally
likely to be behind door 1 and door 2. Thus, there is no reason to switch. However,
another argument suggests you should switch: if a goat is behind door 1 (which happens
with probability 2/3), switching helps; if a car is behind door 1 (which happens with
probability 1/3), switching hurts. Which argument is right?
Example 1.2 : The three-prisoners puzzle [Bar-Hillel and Falk 1982; Gardner 1961;
Mosteller 1965]: Of three prisoners a, b, and c, two are to be executed, but a does
not know which. Thus, a thinks that the probability that i will be executed is 2/3 for
i ∈ {a, b, c}. He says to the jailer, “Since either b or c is certainly going to be executed,
you will give me no information about my own chances if you give me the name of one
man, either b or c, who is going to be executed.” But then, no matter what the jailer
says, naive conditioning leads a to believe that his chance of execution went down from
2/3 to 1/2.
There are numerous other well-known examples where naive conditioning gives what
seems to be an inappropriate answer, including the two-children puzzle [Gardner 1982;
vos Savant 1996; vos Savant 1994] and the second-ace puzzle [Freund 1965; Shafer 1985;
Halpern and Tuttle 1993].1
Why does naive conditioning give the wrong answer in such examples? As argued in
[Halpern and Tuttle 1993; Shafer 1985], the real problem is that we are not conditioning
in the right space. If we work in a larger “sophisticated” space, where we take the protocol
used by Monty (in Example 1.1) and the jailer (in Example 1.2) into account, conditioning
does deliver the right answer. Roughly speaking, the sophisticated space consists of all
the possible sequences of events that could happen (for example, what Monty would
say in each circumstance, or what the jailer would say in each circumstance), with their
probability.2 However, working in the sophisticated space has problems too. For one
thing, it is not always clear what the relevant probabilities in the sophisticated space are.
For example, what is the probability that the jailer says b if b and c are to be executed?
Indeed, in some cases, it is not even clear what the elements of the larger space are.
Moreover, even when the elements and the relevant probabilities are known, the size of
the sophisticated space may become an issue, as the following example shows.
Example 1.3: Suppose that a world describes which of 100 people have a certain disease.
A world can be characterized by a tuple of 100 0s and 1s, where the ith component is
1Both the Monty Hall puzzle and the two-children puzzle were discussed in Ask Marilyn, Marilyn
vos Savant’s weekly column in “Parade Magazine”. Of all Ask Marilyn columns ever published, they
reportedly [vos Savant 1994] generated respectively the most and the second-most response.
2The notions of “naive space” and “sophisticated space” will be formalized in Section 2. This intro-
duction is meant only to give an intuitive feel for the issues.
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1 iff individual i has the disease. There are 2100 possible worlds. Further suppose that
the “agent” in question is a computer system. Initially, the agent has no information,
and considers all 2100 worlds equally likely. The agent then receives information that is
assumed to be true about which world is the actual world. This information comes in
the form of statements like “individual i is sick or individual j is healthy” or “at least 7
people have the disease”. Each such statement can be identified with a set of possible
worlds. For example, the statement “at least 7 people have the disease” can be identified
with the set of tuples with at least 7 1s. For simplicity, assume that the agent is given
information saying “the actual world is in set U”, for various sets U . Suppose at some
point the agent has been told that the actual world is in U1, . . . , Un. Then, after doing
conditioning, the agent has a uniform probability on U1 ∩ . . . ∩ Un.
But how does the agent keep track of the worlds it considers possible? It certainly
will not explicitly list them; there are simply too many. One possibility is that it keeps
track of what it has been told; the possible worlds are then the ones consistent with
what it has been told. But this leads to two obvious problems: checking for consistency
with what it has been told may be hard, and if it has been told n things for large n,
remembering them all may be infeasible. In situations where these two problems arise,
an agent may not be able to condition appropriately.
Example 1.3 provides some motivation for working in the smaller, more naive space. Ex-
amples 1.1 and 1.2 show that this is not always appropriate. Thus, an obvious question
is when it is appropriate. It turns out that this question is highly relevant in the statis-
tical areas of selectively reported data and missing data. Originally studied within these
contexts [Rubin 1976; Dawid and Dickey 1977], it was later found that it also plays a
fundamental role in the statistical work on survival analysis [Kleinbaum 1999]. Building
on previous approaches, Heitjan and Rubin [1991] presented a necessary and sufficient
condition for when conditioning in the “naive space” is appropriate. Nowadays this so-
called CAR (Coarsening at Random) condition is an established tool in survival analysis.
(See [Gill, van der Laan, and Robins 1997; Nielsen 1998] for overviews.) We examine
this criterion in our own, rather different context, and show that it applies rather rarely.
Specifically, we show that there are realistic settings where the sample space is structured
in such a way that it is impossible to satisfy CAR, and we provide a criterion to help
determine whether or not this is the case. We also give a procedural characterization of
the CAR condition, by giving a randomized algorithm that generates all and only distri-
butions for which CAR holds, thereby solving an open problem posed in [Gill, van der
Laan, and Robins 1997].
We then show that the situation is worse if the information does not come in the
form of an event. For that case, several generalizations of conditioning have been pro-
posed. Perhaps the best known are Jeffrey conditioning [Jeffrey 1968] (also known as
Jeffrey’s rule) and Minimum Relative Entropy (MRE) Updating [Kullback 1959; Csisza´r
1975; Shore and Johnson 1980] (also known as cross-entropy). Jeffrey conditioning is
a generalization of ordinary conditioning; MRE updating is a generalization of Jeffrey
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conditioning.
We show that Jeffrey conditioning, when applicable, can be justified under an appro-
priate generalization of the CAR condition. Although it has been argued, using mostly
axiomatic characterizations, that MRE updating (and hence also Jeffrey conditioning) is,
when applicable, the only reasonable way to update probability (see, e.g., [Csisza´r 1991;
Shore and Johnson 1980]), it is well known that there are situations where applying MRE
leads to paradoxical, highly counterintuitive results [Hunter 1989; Seidenfeld 1986; van
Fraassen 1981].
Example 1.4: Consider the Judy Benjamin problem [van Fraassen 1981]: Judy is lost
in a region that is divided into two halves, Blue and Red territory, each of which is
further divided into Headquarters Company area and Second Company area. A priori,
Judy considers it equally likely that she is in any of these four quadrants. She contacts
her own headquarters by radio, and is told “I can’t be sure where you are. If you are
in Red territory, the odds are 3:1 that you are in HQ Company area ...” At this point
the radio gives out. MRE updating on this information leads to a distribution where the
posterior probability of being in Blue territory is greater than 1/2. Indeed, if HQ had
said “If you are in Red territory, the odds are α : 1 that you are in HQ company area
. . . ”, then for all α 6= 1, according to MRE updating, the posterior probability of being
in Blue territory is always greater than 1/2.
In [Grove and Halpern 1997], a “sophisticated space” is provided where conditioning
gives what is arguably the more intuitive answer in the Judy Benjamin problem, namely
that if HQ sends a message of the form “if you are in Red territory, then the odds are
α : 1 that you are in HQ company area” then Judy’s posterior probability of being
in each of the two quadrants in Blue remains at 1/4. Seidenfeld [1986], strengthening
results of Friedman and Shimony [1971], showed that there is no sophisticated space in
which conditioning will give the same answer as MRE in this case. (See also [Dawid
2001] for similar results along these lines.) We strengthen these results by showing
that, even in a class of much simpler situations (where Jeffrey conditioning cannot be
applied), using MRE in the naive space corresponds to conditioning in the sophisticated
space in essentially only trivial cases. These results taken together show that generally
speaking, working with the naive space, while an attractive approach, is likely to give
highly misleading answers. That is the main message of this paper.
We remark that, although there are certain similarities, our results are quite different
in spirit from the well-known results of Diaconis and Zabell [1986]. They considered when
a posterior probability could be viewed as the result of conditioning a prior probability
on some larger space. By way of contrast, we have a fixed larger space in mind (the
“sophisticated space”), and are interested in when conditioning in the naive space and
the sophisticated space agree.
It is also worth stressing that the distinction between the naive and the sophisticated
space is entirely unrelated to the philosophical view that one has of probability and how
4
one should do probabilistic inference. For example, the probabilities in the Monty Hall
puzzle can be viewed as the participant’s subjective probabilities about the location of
the car and about what Monty will say under what circumstances; alternatively, they can
be viewed as “frequentist” probabilities, inferred from watching the Monty Hall show on
television for many weeks and then setting the probabilities equal to observed frequencies.
The problem we address occurs both from a frequentist and from a subjective stance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the notion of
naive and sophisticated spaces. In Section 3, we consider the case where the information
comes in the form of an event. We describe the CAR condition and show that it is violated
in a general setting of which the Monty Hall and three-prisoners puzzle are special cases.
In Section 4 we give several characterizations of CAR. We supply conditions under which
it is guaranteed to hold and guaranteed not to hold, and we give a randomized algorithm
that generates all and only distributions for which CAR holds. In Section 5 we consider
the case where the information is not in the form of an event. We first consider situations
where Jeffrey conditioning can be applied. We show that Jeffrey conditioning in the naive
space gives the appropriate answer iff a generalized CAR condition holds. We then show
that, typically, applying MRE in the naive space does not give the appropriate answer.
We conclude with some discussion of the implication of these results in Section 6.
2 Naive vs. Sophisticated Spaces
Our formal model is a special case of the multi-agent systems framework [Halpern and
Fagin 1989], which is essentially the same as that used in [Friedman and Halpern 1997]
to model belief revision. We assume that there is some external world in a set W , and
an agent who makes observations or gets information about that world. We can describe
the situation by a pair (w, l), where w ∈ W is the actual world, and l is the agent’s local
state, which essentially characterizes her information. W is what we called the “naive
space” in the introduction. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that l has the form
〈o1, . . . , on〉, where oj is the observation that the agent makes at time j, j = 1, . . . , n. This
representation implicitly assumes that the agent remembers everything she has observed
(since her local state encodes all the previous observations). Thus, we ignore memory
issues here. We also ignore computational issues, just so as to be able to focus on when
conditioning is appropriate.
A pair (w, 〈o1, . . . , on〉) is called a run. A run may be viewed as a complete description
of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. For simplicity, in
this paper, we assume that the state of the world does not change over time. The
“sophisticated space” is the set of all possible runs.
In the Monty Hall puzzle, the naive space has three worlds, representing the three
possible locations of the car. The sophisticated space describes what Monty would have
said in all circumstances (i.e., Monty’s protocol) as well as where the car is. The three-
prisoners puzzle is treated in detail in Example 2.1 below. While in these cases the so-
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phisticated space is still relatively simple, this is no longer the case for the Judy Benjamin
puzzle. Although the naive space has only four elements, constructing the sophisticated
space involves considering all the things that HQ could have said, which is far from clear,
and the conditions under which HQ says any particular thing. Grove and Halpern [1997]
discuss the difficulties in constructing such a sophisticated space.
In general, not only is it not clear what the sophisticated space is, but the need for a
sophisticated space and the form it must take may become clear only after the fact. For
example, in the Judy Benjamin problem, before contacting headquarters, Judy would
almost certainly not have had a sophisticated space in mind (even assuming she was an
expert in probability), and could not have known the form it would have to take until
after hearing headquarter’s response.
In any case, if the agent has a prior probability on the set R of possible runs in the
sophisticated space, after hearing or observing 〈o1, . . . , ok〉, she can condition, to get a
posterior on R. Formally, the agent is conditioning her prior on the set of runs where
her local state at time k is 〈o1, . . . , ok〉.
Clearly the agent’s probability Pr on R induces a probability PrW onW by marginal-
ization. We are interested in whether the agent can compute her posterior on W after
observing 〈o1, . . . , ok〉 in a relatively simple way, without having to work in the sophisti-
cated space.
Example 2.1: Consider the three-prisoners puzzle in more detail. Here the naive space is
W = {wa, wb, wc}, where wx is the world where x is not executed. We are only interested
in runs of length 1, so n = 1. The set O of observations (what agent can be told) is
{{wa, wb}, {wa, wc}}. Here “{wa, wb}” corresponds to the observation that either a or
b will not be executed (i.e., the jailer saying “c will be executed”); similarly, {wa, wc}
corresponds to the jailer saying “b will be executed”. The sophisticated space consists of
the four runs
(wa, 〈{wa, wb}〉), (wa, 〈{wa, wc}〉), (wb, 〈{wa, wb}〉), (wc, 〈{wa, wc}〉).
Note that there is no run with observation 〈{wb, wc}〉, since the jailer will not tell a that
he will be executed.
According to the story, the prior PrW in the naive space has PrW (w) = 1/3 for
w ∈ W . The full distribution Pr on the runs is not completely specified by the story. In
particular, we are not told the probability with which the jailer will say b and c if a will
not be executed. We return to this point in Example 3.2.
3 The CAR Condition
A particularly simple setting is where the agent observes or learns that the external world
is in some set U ⊆ W . For simplicity, we assume throughout this paper that the agent
6
makes only one observation, and makes it at the first step of the run. Thus, the set O of
possible observations consists of nonempty subsets ofW . Thus, any run r can be written
as r = (w, 〈U〉) where w is the actual world and U is a nonempty subset of W . However,
O does not necessarily consist of all the nonempty subsets ofW . Some subsets may never
be observed. For example, in Example 2.1, a is never told that he will be executed, so
{wb, wc} is not observed. We assume that the agent’s observations are accurate, in that
if the agent observes U in a run r, then the actual world in r is in U . That is, we assume
that all runs are of the form r = (w, 〈U〉) where w ∈ U . In Example 2.1, accuracy is
enforced by the requirement that runs have the form (wx, 〈{wx, wy}〉).
The observation or information obtained does not have to be exactly of the form
“the actual world is in U”. It suffices that it is equivalent to such a statement. This is
the case in both the Monty Hall puzzle and the three-prisoners puzzle. For example, in
the three-prisoners puzzle, being told that b will be executed is essentially equivalent to
observing {wa, wc} (either a or c will not be executed).
In this setting, we can ask whether, after observing U , the agent can compute her
posterior onW by conditioning on U . Roughly speaking, this amounts to asking whether
observing U is the same as discovering that U is true. This may not be the case in
general—observing or being told U may carry more information than just the fact that
U is true. For example, if for some reason a knows that the jailer would never say c if
he could help it (so that, in particular, if b and c will be executed, then he will definitely
say b), then hearing c (i.e., observing {wa, wb}) tells a much more than the fact that the
true world is one of wa or wb. It says that the true world must be wb (for if the true
world were wa, the jailer would have said b).
In the remainder of this paper we assume that W is finite. For every scenario we
consider we define a set of possible observations O, consisting of nonempty subsets of W .
For given W and O, the set of runs R is then defined to be the set
R = {(w, 〈U〉 | U ∈ O,w ∈ U}.
Given our assumptions that the state does not change over time and that the agent
makes only one observation, the set R of runs can be viewed as a subset of W × O.
While just taking R to be a subset of W × O would slightly simplify the presentation
here, in general, we certainly want to allow sequences of observations. (Consider, for
example, an n-door version of the Monty Hall problem, where Monty opens a sequence
of doors.) This framework extends naturally to that setting.
Whenever we speak of a distribution Pr on R, we implicitly assume that the prob-
ability of any set on which we condition is strictly greater than 0. Let XW and XO be
two random variables on R, where XW is the actual world and XO is the observed event.
Thus, for r = (w, 〈U〉), XW (r) = w and XO(r) = U . Given a distribution Pr on runs R,
we denote by PrW the marginal distribution of XW , and by PrO the marginal distribution
of XO. For example, for V, U ⊆ W , PrW (V ) is short for Pr(XW ∈ V ) and PrW (V |U) is
short for Pr(XW ∈ V |XW ∈ U).
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Let Pr be a prior on R and let Pr′ = Pr(· |XO = U) be the posterior after observing
U . The main question we ask in this paper is under what conditions we have
Pr′W (V ) = PrW (V |U) (1)
for all V ⊆ W . That is, we want to know under what conditions the posterior W
induced by Pr′ can be computed from the prior onW by conditioning on the observation.
(Example 3.2 below gives a concrete case.) We stress that Pr and Pr′ are distributions
on R, while PrW and Pr
′
W are distributions on W (obtained by marginalization from Pr
and Pr′, respectively). Note that (1) is equivalently stated as
Pr(XW = w |XO = U) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ U) for all w ∈ U. (2)
(1) (equivalently, (2)) is called the “CAR condition”. It can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 3.1: [Gill, van der Laan, and Robins 1997] Fix a probability Pr on R and a
set U ⊆W . The following are equivalent:
(a) If Pr(XO = U) > 0, then Pr(XW = w |XO = U) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ U) for all
w ∈ U .
(b) The event XW = w is independent of the event XO = U given XW ∈ U , for all
w ∈ U .
(c) Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = Pr(XO = U |XW ∈ U) for all w ∈ U such that Pr(XW =
w) > 0.
(d) Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = Pr(XO = U |XW = w
′) for all w,w′ ∈ U such that
Pr(XW = w) > 0 and Pr(XW = w
′) > 0.
For completeness (and because it is useful for our later Theorem 5.1), we provide a
proof of Theorem 3.1 in the appendix.
The first condition in Theorem 3.1 is just (2). The third and fourth conditions justify
the name “coarsening at random”. Intuitively, first some world w ∈ W is realized, and
then some “coarsening mechanism” decides which event U ⊆ W such that w ∈ U is
revealed to the agent. The event U is called a “coarsening” of w. The third and fourth
conditions effectively say that the probability that w is coarsened to U is the same for
all w ∈ U . This means that the “coarsening mechanism” is such that the probability of
observing U is not affected by the specific value of w ∈ U that was realized.
In the remainder of this paper, when we say “Pr satisfies CAR”, we mean that Pr
satisfies condition (a) of Theorem 3.1 (or, equivalently, any of the other three conditions)
for all U ∈ O. Thus, “Pr satisfies CAR” means that conditioning in the naive space
W coincides with conditioning in the sophisticated space R with probability 1. The
CAR condition explains why conditioning in the naive space is not appropriate in the
Monty Hall puzzle or the three-prisoners puzzle. We consider the three-prisoners puzzle
in detail; a similar analysis applies to Monty Hall.
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Example 3.2: In the three-prisoners puzzle, what is a’s prior distribution Pr on R? In
Example 2.1 we assumed that the marginal distribution PrW on W is uniform. Apart
from this, Pr is unspecified. Now suppose that a observes {wa, wc} (“the jailer says
b”). Naive conditioning would lead a to adopt the distribution PrW (· | {wa, wc}). This
distribution satisfies PrW (wa | {wa, wc}) = 1/2. Sophisticated conditioning leads a to
adopt the distribution Pr′ = Pr(· |XO = {wa, wc}). By part (d) of Theorem 3.1, naive
conditioning is appropriate (i.e., Pr′W = PrW (· | {wa, wc})) only if the jailer is equally
likely to say b in both worlds wa and wc. Since the jailer must say that b will be executed
in world wc, it follows that Pr(XO = {wa, wc} |XW = wc) = 1. Thus, conditioning is
appropriate only if the jailer’s protocol is such that he definitely says b in wa, i.e., even
if both b and c are executed. But if this is the case, when the jailer says c, conditioning
PrW on {wa, wb} is not appropriate, since then a knows that he will be executed. The
world cannot be wa, for then the jailer would have said b. Therefore, no matter what the
jailer’s protocol is, conditioning in the naive space cannot coincide with conditioning in
the sophisticated space for both of his responses.
The following example shows that in general, in settings of the type arising in the Monty
Hall and the three-prisoners puzzle, the CAR condition can only be satisfied in very
special cases:
Example 3.3: Suppose that O = {U1, U2}, and both U1 and U2 are observed with
positive probability. (This is the case for both Monty Hall and the three-prisoners puz-
zle.) Then the CAR condition (Theorem 3.1(c)) cannot hold for both U1 and U2 unless
Pr(XW ∈ U1∩U2) is either 0 or 1. For suppose that Pr(XO = U1) > 0, Pr(XO = U2) > 0,
and 0 < Pr(XW ∈ U1 ∩ U2) < 1. Without loss of generality, there is some w1 ∈ U1 − U2
and w2 ∈ U1∩U2 such that Pr(XW = w1) > 0 and Pr(XW = w2) > 0. Since observations
are accurate, we must have Pr(XO = U1 |XW = w1) = 1. If CAR holds for U1, then we
must have Pr(XO = U1 |XW = w2) = 1. But then Pr(XO = U2 |XW = w2) = 0. But
since Pr(XO = U2) > 0, it follows that there is some w3 ∈ U2 such that Pr(XW = w3) > 0
and Pr(XO = U2 |XW = w3) > 0. This contradicts the CAR condition.
So when does CAR hold? The previous example exhibited a combination of O and W
for which CAR can only be satisfied in “degenerate” cases. In the next section, we shall
study this question for arbitrary combinations of O and W .
4 Characterizing CAR
In this section, we provide some characterizations of when the CAR condition holds, for
finite O and W . Our results extend earlier results of Gill, van der Laan, and Robins
[1997]. We first exhibit a simple situation in which CAR is guaranteed to hold, and we
show that this is the only situation in which it is guaranteed to hold. We then show
that, for arbitrary O and W , we can construct a 0-1–valued matrix from which a strong
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necessary condition for CAR to hold can be obtained. It turns out that, in some cases
of interest, CAR is (roughly speaking) guaranteed not to hold except in “degenerate”
situations. Finally, we introduce a new “procedural” characterization of CAR: we provide
a mechanism such that a distribution Pr can be thought of as arising from the mechanism
if and only if Pr satisfies CAR.
4.1 When CAR is guaranteed to hold
We first consider the only situation where CAR is guaranteed to hold: if the sets in O
are pairwise disjoint.
Proposition 4.1: The CAR condition holds for all distributions Pr on R if and only if
O consists of pairwise disjoint subsets of W .
What happens if the sets in O are not pairwise disjoint? Are there still cases (com-
binations of O, W , and distributions on R) when CAR holds? There are, but they are
quite special.
4.2 When CAR may hold
We now present a lemma that provides a new characterization of CAR in terms of a
simple 0/1-matrix. The lemma allows us to determine for many combinations of O and
W , whether a distribution onR exists that satisfies CAR and gives certain worlds positive
probability.
Fix a set R of runs, whose worlds are in some finite set W and whose observations
come from some finite set O = {U1, . . . , Un}. We say that A ⊆W is an R-atom relative
to W and O if A has the form V1 ∩ . . . ∩ Vn, where each Vi is either Ui or U i, and
{r ∈ R : XW (r) ∈ A} 6= ∅. Let A = {A1, . . . , Am} be the set of R-atoms relative to
W and O. We can think of A as a partition of the worlds according to what can be
observed. Two worlds w1 and w2 are in the same set Ai ∈ A if there are no observations
that distinguish them; that is, there is no observation U ∈ O such that w1 ∈ U and
w2 6∈ U . Define the m× n matrix S with entries sij as follows:
sij =
{
1 if Ai ⊆ Uj
0 otherwise.
(3)
We call S the CARacterizing matrix (forO andW ). Note that each row i in S corresponds
to a unique atom inA; we call this the atom corresponding to row i. This matrix (actually,
its transpose) was first introduced (but for a different purpose) in [Gill, van der Laan,
and Robins 1997].
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Example 4.2: Returning to Example 3.3, the CARacterizing matrix is given by

 1 01 1
0 1

 ,
where the columns correspond to U1 and U2 and the rows correspond to the three atoms
U1 − U2, U1 ∩ U2 and U2 − U1. For example, the fact that entry s31 of this matrix is 0
indicates that U1 cannot be observed if the actual world w is in U2 − U1.
In the following lemma, ~γT denotes the transpose of the (row) vector ~γ, and ~1 denotes
the row vector consisting of all 1s.
Lemma 4.3: Let R be the set of runs over observations O and worlds W , and let S be
the CARacterizing matrix for O and W .
(a) Let Pr be any distribution over R and let S ′ be the matrix obtained by deleting from
S all rows corresponding to an atom A with Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0. Define the vector
~γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) by setting γj = Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) if Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0, and
γj = 0 otherwise, for j = 1 . . . n. If Pr satisfies CAR, then S
′ · ~γT = ~1T .
(b) Let S ′ be a matrix consisting of a subset of the rows of S, and let PW,S′ be the set
of distributions over W with support corresponding to S ′; i.e.,
PW,S′ = {PW |PW (A) > 0 iff A corresponds to a row in S
′}.
If there exists a vector ~γ ≥ ~0 such that S ′ ·~γT = ~1T , then, for all PW ∈ PW,S′, there
exists a distribution Pr over R with PrW = PW (i.e., the marginal of Pr on W is
PW ) such that (a) Pr satisfies CAR and (b) Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) = γj for all j
with Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0.
Note that (b) is essentially a converse of (a). A natural question to ask is whether (b)
would still hold if we replaced “for all PW ∈ PW,S′ there exists Pr satisfying CAR with
PrW = PW” by “for all distributions PO over O there exists Pr satisfying CAR with
PrO = PO.” The answer is no; see Example 4.6(b)(ii).
Lemma 4.3 says that a distribution Pr that satisfies CAR and at the same time has
Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for m different atoms A can exist if and only if a certain set of m linear
equations in n unknowns has a solution. In many situations of interest, m ≥ n (note that
m may be as large as 2n−1). Not surprisingly then, in such situations there often can be
no distribution Pr that satisfies CAR, as we show in the next subsection. On the other
hand, if the set of equations S ′~γT = ~1 does have a solution in ~γ, then the set of all solutions
forms the intersection of an affine subspace (i.e. a hyperplane) of Rn and the positive
orthant [0,∞)n. These solutions are just the conditional probabilities Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈
Uj) for all distributions for which CAR holds that have support corresponding to S
′.
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These conditional probabilities may then be extended to a distribution over R by setting
PrW = PW for an arbitrary distribution PW over the worlds in atoms corresponding to
S ′; all Pr constructed in this way satisfy CAR.
Summarizing, we have the remarkable fact that for any given set of atoms A there
are only two possibilities: either no distribution exists which has Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for
all A ∈ A and satisfies CAR, or for all distributions PW over worlds corresponding to
atoms in A, there exists a distribution satisfying CAR with marginal distribution over
worlds equal to PW .
4.3 When CAR is guaranteed not to hold
We now present a theorem that gives two explicit and easy-to-check sufficient conditions
under which CAR cannot hold unless the probabilities of some atoms and/or observations
are 0. The theorem is proved by showing that the condition of Lemma 4.3(a) cannot
hold under the stated conditions.
We briefly recall some standard definitions from linear algebra. A set of vectors
~v1, . . . , ~vm is called linearly dependent if there exist coefficients λ1, . . . , λm (not all zero)
such that
∑m
i=1 λi~vi = ~0; the vectors are affinely dependent if there exist coefficients
λ1, . . . , λm (not all zero) such that
∑m
i=1 λi~vi = ~0 and
∑m
i=1 λi = 0. A vector ~u is called an
affine combination of ~v1, . . . , ~vm if there exist coefficients λ1, . . . , λm such that
∑m
i=1 λi~vi =
~u and
∑m
i=1 λi = 0.
Theorem 4.4: Let R be a set of runs over observations O = {U1, . . . , Un} and worlds
W , and let S be the CARacterizing matrix for O and W .
(a) Suppose that there exists a subset R of the rows in S and a vector ~u = (u1, . . . , un)
that is an affine combination of the rows of R such that uj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and uj∗ > 0 for some j
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there is no distribution Pr on R that
satisfies CAR such that Pr(XO = Uj∗) > 0 and Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for each R-atom
A corresponding to a row in R.
(b) If there exists a subset R of the rows of S that is linearly dependent but not affinely
dependent, then there is no distribution Pr on R that satisfies CAR such that
Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for each R-atom A corresponding to a row in R.
(c) Given a set R consisting of n linearly independent rows of S and a distribution
PW on W such that PW (A) > 0 for all A corresponding to a row in R, there is a
unique distribution PO on O such that if Pr is a distribution on R satisfying CAR
and Pr(XW ∈ A) = PW (A) for each atom A corresponding to a row in R, then
Pr(XO = U) = PO(U).
It is well known that in an m×n matrix, at most n rows can be linearly independent.
In many cases of interest (cf. Example 4.5 below), the number of atoms m is larger than
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the number of observations n, so that there must exist subsets R of rows of S that are
linearly dependent. Thus, part (b) of Theorem 4.4 puts nontrivial constraints on the
distributions that satisfy CAR.
The requirement in part (a) may seem somewhat obscure but it can be easily checked
and applied in a number of situations, as illustrated in Example 4.5 and 4.6 below. Part
(c) says that in many other cases of interest where neither part (a) nor (b) applies, even
if a distribution on R exists satisfying CAR, the probabilities of making the observations
are completely determined by the probability of various events in the world occurring,
which seems rather unreasonable.
Example 4.5: Consider the CARacterizing matrix of Example 4.2. Notice there exists
an affine combination of the first two rows that is not ~0 and has no negative components:
−1 ·
(
1
0
)
+ 1 ·
(
1
1
)
=
(
0
1
)
.
Similarly, there exists an affine combination of the last two rows that is not ~0 and has
no negative components. It follows from Theorem 4.4(a) that there is no distribution
satisfying CAR that gives both of the observations XO = U1 and XO = U2 positive
probability and either (a) gives bothXW ∈ U1−U2 and XW ∈ U1∩U2 positive probability
or (b) gives both XW ∈ U2 − U1 and XW ∈ U1 ∩ U2 positive probability. If both
observations have positive probability, then CAR can hold only if the probability of
U1 ∩U2 is either 0 or 1. (Example 3.3 already shows this using a more direct argument.)
The next example further illustrates that in general, it can be very difficult to satisfy
CAR.
Example 4.6: Suppose that O = {U1, U2, U3}, and all three observations can be made
with positive probability. It turns out that in this situation the CAR condition can hold,
but only if (a) Pr(XW ∈ U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3) = 1 (i.e., all of U1, U2, and U3 must hold), (b)
Pr(XW ∈ ((U1∩U2)−U3)∪((U2∩U3)−U1)∪((U1∩U3)−U2)) = 1 (i.e., exactly two of U1,
U2, and U3 must hold), (c) Pr(XW ∈ (U1−(U2∪U3))∪(U2−(U1∪U3))∪(U3−(U2∪U1))) = 1
(i.e., exactly one of U1, U2, or U3 must hold), or (d) one of (U1 − (U2 ∪ U3)) ∪ (U2 ∩ U3),
(U2 − (U1 ∪ U3)) ∪ (U1 ∩ U3) or (U3 − (U1 ∪ U2)) ∪ (U1 ∩ U2) has probability 1 (either
exactly one of U1, U2, or U3 holds, or the remaining two both hold).
We first check that CAR can hold in all these cases. It should be clear that CAR
can hold in case (a). Moreover, there are no constraints on Pr(XO = Ui |XW = w) for
w ∈ U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3 (except, by the CAR condition, for each fixed i, the probability must
be the same for all w ∈ U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3, and the three probabilities must sum to 1).
For case (b), let Ai be the atom where exactly two of U1, U2, and U3 hold, and Ui
does not hold, for i = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that Pr(XW ∈ A1∪A2∪A3) = 1. Note that, since
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all three observations can be made with positive probability, at least two of A1, A2, and
A3 must have positive probability. Hence we can distinguish between two subcases: (i)
only two of them have positive probability, and (ii) all three have positive probability.
For subcase (i), suppose without loss of generality that only A1 and A2 have positive
probability. Then it immediately follows from the CAR condition that there must be
some α with 0 < α < 1 such that Pr(XO = U3 |XW = w) = α, for all w ∈ A1 ∪ A2
such that Pr(XW = w) > 0. Thus, Pr(XO = U1 |XW = w) = 1 − α for all w ∈ A2 such
that Pr(XW = w) > 0, and Pr(XO = U2 |XW = w) = 1 − α for all w ∈ A1 such that
Pr(XW = w) > 0.
Subcase (ii) is more interesting. The rows of the CARacterizing matrix S correspond-
ing to A1, A2, and A3 are (0 1 1), (1 0 1), and (1 1 0), respectively. Now Lemma 4.3(a)
tells us that if Pr satisfies CAR, then we must have S · ~γT = ~1T for some ~γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3)
with γi = Pr(XO = Ui |XW ∈ Ui). These three linear equations have solution
γ1 = γ2 = γ3 =
1
2
.
Since this solution is unique, it follows by Lemma 4.3(b) that all distributions that
satisfy CAR must have conditional probabilities Pr(XO = Ui |XW ∈ Ui) = 1/2, and that
their marginal distributions on W can be arbitrary. This fully characterizes the set of
distributions Pr for which CAR holds in this case. Note that for i = 1, 2, 3, since we can
write γi = Pr(XO = Ui)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui) we have Pr(XO = Ui) = Pr(Xw ∈ Ui)γi ≤ 1/2 so
that, in contrast to the marginal distribution over W , the marginal distribution over O
cannot be chosen arbitrarily.
In case (c), it should also be clear that CAR can hold. Moreover, Pr(X0 = Ui |XW =
w) is either 0 or 1, depending on whether w ∈ Ui. Finally, for case (d), suppose that
Pr(XW ∈ U1∪(U2∩U3)) = 1. CAR holds iff there exists α such that Pr(XO = U2 |XW =
w) = α and Pr(XO = U3 |XW = w) = 1−α for all w ∈ U2∩U3 such that Pr(XW = w) > 0.
(Of course, Pr(XO = U1 |XW = w) = 1 for all w ∈ U1 such that Pr(XW = w) > 0.)
Now we show that CAR cannot hold in any other case. First suppose that 0 <
Pr(XW ∈ U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3) < 1. Thus, there must be at least one other atom A such
that Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0. The row corresponding to the atom U1 ∩ U2 ∩ U3 is (1 1 1).
Suppose r is the row corresponding to the other atom A. Since S is a 0-1 matrix, the
vector (1 1 1)− r gives is an affine combination of (1 1 1) and r that is nonzero and has
nonnegative components. It now follows by Theorem 4.4 that CAR cannot hold in this
case.
Similar arguments give a contradiction in all the other cases; we leave details to the
reader.
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4.4 Discussion: “CAR is everything” vs. “sometimes CAR is
nothing”
In one of their main theorems, Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [1997, Section 2] show that
the CAR assumption is untestable from observations of XO alone, in the sense that the
assumption “Pr satisfies CAR” imposes no restrictions at all on the marginal distribution
PrO on XO. More precisely, they show that for every finite set W of worlds, every set O
of observations, and every distribution PO on O, there is a distribution Pr
∗ on R such
that Pr∗O (the marginal of Pr
∗ on O) is equal to PO and Pr
∗ satisfies CAR. The authors
summarize this as “CAR is everything”.
We must be careful in interpreting this result. Theorem 4.4 shows that, for many
combinations of O andW , CAR can hold only for distributions Pr with Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0
for some atoms A. (In the previous sections, we called such distributions “degenerate”.)
In our view, this says that in some cases, CAR effectively cannot hold. To see why,
first suppose we are given a set W of worlds and a set O of observations. Now we
may feel confident a priori that some U0 ∈ O and some w0 ∈ W cannot occur in
practice. In this case, we are willing to consider only distributions Pr on O ×W that
have Pr(XO = U0) = 0, Pr(XW = w0) = 0. (For example, W may be a product space
W = Wa ×Wb and it is known that some combination wa ∈ Wa and wb in Wb can never
occur together; then Pr(Xw = (wa, wb)) = 0.) Define O
∗ to be the subset of O consisting
of all U that we cannot a priori rule out; similarly, W ∗ is the subset of W consisting of
all w that we cannot a priori rule out. By Theorem 4.4, it is still possible that O∗ and
W ∗ are such that, even if we restrict to runs where only observations in O∗ are made,
CAR can only hold if Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0 for some atoms (nonempty subsets) A ⊆ W
∗.
This means that CAR may force us to assign probability 0 to some events that, a priori,
were considered possible. Examples 3.3 and 4.6 illustrate this phenomeonon. We may
summarize this as “sometimes CAR is nothing”.
Given therefore that CAR imposes such strong conditions, the reader may wonder
why there is so much study of the CAR condition in the statistics literature. The reason
is that some of the special situations in which CAR holds often arise in missing data and
survival analysis problems. Here is an example: Suppose that the set of observations can
be written as O = ∪ki=1Πi, where each Πi is a partition of W (that is, a set of pairwise
disjoint subsets ofW whose union isW ). Further suppose that observations are generated
by the following process, which we call CARgen. Some i between 1 and k is chosen
according to some arbitrary distribution P0; independently, w ∈ W is chosen according
to PW . The agent then observes the unique U ∈ Πi such that w ∈ U . Intuitively, the
partitions Πi may represent the observations that can be made with a particular sensor.
Thus, P0 determines the probability that a particular sensor is chosen; PW determines
the probability that a particular world is chosen. The sensor and the world together
determine the observation that is made. It is easy to see that this mechanism induces a
distribution on R for which CAR holds.
The special case with O = Π1∪Π2, Π1 = {W}, and Π2 = {{w} |w ∈ W} corresponds
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to a simple missing data problem (Example 4.7 below). Intuitively, either complete
information is given, or there is no data at all. In this context, CAR is often called MAR:
missing at random. In more realistic MAR problems, we may observe a vector with some
of its components missing. In such cases the CAR condition sometimes still holds. In
practical missing data problems, the goal is often to infer the distribution Pr on runs R
from successive observations of XO. That is, one observes a sample U(1), U(2), . . . , U(n),
where U(i) ∈ O. Typically, the U(i) are assumed to be an i.i.d. (independently identically
distributed) sample of outcomes ofXO. The corresponding “worlds” w1, w2, . . . (outcomes
of XW ) are not observed. Depending on the situation, Pr may be completely unknown or
is assumed to be a member of some parametric family of distributions. If the number of
observations n is large, then clearly the sample U(1), U(2), . . . , U(n) can be used to obtain
a reasonable estimate of PrO, the marginal distribution on XO. But one is interested
in the full distribution Pr. That distribution usually cannot be inferred without making
additional assumptions, such as the CAR assumption.
Example 4.7: (adapted from [Scharfstein, Daniels, and Robins 2002]) Suppose that a
medical study is conducted to test the effect of a new drug. The drug is administered
to a group of patients on a weekly basis. Before the experiment is started and after it is
finished, some characteristic (say, the blood pressure) of the patients is measured. The
data are thus differences in blood pressure for individual patients before and after the
treatment. In practical studies of this kind, often several of the patients drop out of the
experiment. For such patients there is then no data. We model this as follows: W is
the set of possible values of the characteristic we are interested in (e.g., blood pressure
difference). O = Π1 ∪ Π2 with Π1 = {W}, and Π2 = {{w} |w ∈ W} as above. For
“compliers” (patients that did not drop out), we observe XO = {w}, where w is the
value of the characteristic we want to measure. For dropouts, we observe XO =W (that
is, we observe nothing at all). We thus have, for example, a sequence of observations
U1 = {w1}, U2 = {w2}, U3 = W,U4 = {w4}, U5 = W, . . . , Un = {wn}. If this sample
is large enough, we can use it to obtain a reasonable estimate of the probability that a
patient drops out (the ratio of outcomes with Ui =W to the total number of outcomes).
We can also get a reasonable estimate of the distribution of XW for the complying
patients. Together these two distributions determine the distribution of XO.
We are interested in the effect of the drug in the general population. Unfortunately,
it may be the case that the effect on dropouts is different from the effect on compliers.
(Scharfstein, Daniels, and Robins [2002] discuss an actual medical study in which physi-
cians judged the effect on dropouts to be very different from the effect of compliers.)
Then we cannot infer the distribution on W from the observations U1, U2, . . . alone with-
out making additional assumptions about how the distribution for dropouts is related to
the distribution for compliers. Perhaps the simplest such assumption that one can make
is that the distribution of XW for dropouts is in fact the same as the distribution of XW
for compliers: the data are “missing at random”. Of course, this assumption is just the
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CAR assumption. By Theorem 3.1(a), CAR holds iff for all w ∈ W
Pr(XW = w |XO =W ) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ W ) = Pr(XW = w),
which means just that the distribution of W is independent of whether a patient drops
out (XO =W ) or not. Thus, if CAR can be assumed, then we can infer the distribution
on W (which is what we are really interested in).
Many problems in missing data and survival analysis are of the kind illustrated above:
The analysis would be greatly simplified if CAR holds, but whether or not this is so
is not clear. It is therefore of obvious interest to investigate whether, from observing
the “coarsened” data U(1), U(2), . . . , U(n) alone, it may already be possible to test the
assumption that CAR holds. For example, one might imagine that there are distributions
on XO for which CAR simply cannot hold. If the empirical distribution of the Ui were
“close” (in the appropriate sense) to a distribution that rules out CAR, the statistician
might infer that Pr does not satisfy CAR. Unfortunately, if O is finite, then the result
of Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [1997, Section 2] referred to at the beginning of this
section shows that we can never rule out CAR in this way.
We are interested in the question of whether CAR can hold in a “nondegenerate”
sense, given O and W . From this point of view, the slogan “sometimes CAR is nothing”
makes sense. In contrast, [Gill, van der Laan, and Robins 1997] were interested in the
question whether CAR can be tested from observations of XO alone. From that point
of view, the slogan “CAR is everything” makes perfect sense. In fact, Gill, van der
Laan, and Robins were quite aware, and explicitly stated, that CAR imposes very strong
assumptions on the distribution Pr. In a later paper, it was even implicitly stated that
in some cases CAR forces Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0 for some atoms A [Robins, Rotnitzky, and
Scharfstein 1999, Section 9.1]. Our contribution is to provide the precise conditions
(Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4) under which this happens.
Robins, Rodnitzky, and Scharfstein [1999] also introduced a Bayesian method (later
extended in [Scharfstein, Daniels, and Robins 2002]) that allows one to specify a prior
distribution over a parameter α which indicates in a precise sense, how much Pr deviates
from CAR. For example, α = 0 corresponds to the set of distributions Pr satisfying CAR.
The precise connection between this work and ours needs further investigation.
4.5 A mechanism for generating distributions satisfying CAR
In Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.3 we described CAR in an algebraic way, as a collection
of probabilities satisfying certain equalities. Is there a more “procedural” way of repre-
senting CAR? In particular, does there exist a single mechanism that gives rise to CAR
such that every case of CAR can be viewed as a special case of this mechanism?
Before we can answer this question, we have to make clear what counts as a mech-
anism. Without any constrainst, there is clearly a trivial solution to the problem, as
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already noted by Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [1997]: Given a distribution Pr satis-
fying CAR, we simply draw a world w according to PrW , and then draw U such w ∈ U
according to the distribution Pr(XO = U |XW = w). This is obviously cheating in some
sense. Intuitively, the problem here is that we cannot “choose” U according to a certain
distribution. We do not have that kind of control over the observations that are made.
So what can we do? Intuitively, the mechanism should be able to control only what
can be controlled in an experimental setup. While it is fair to assume that we are given
some sensor, it is not fair to assume that we can control their output (or exactly what
they can sense). Assume that we are given a world w ∈ W , generated according to some
distribution PW . Intuitively, we do not have control over PW . Given PW , our goal is to
find a procedure that generates all and only the distributions Pr satisfying CAR such
that PrW = PW . One approach is to assume that the agent gets to make observations,
using possibly different sensors. While the agent can choose which sensor to observe,
it cannot choose what the sensor observes. Indeed, given a world w, then observation
returned by the sensor is determined. This is exactly what is done in the CARgen
scheme discussed in Section 4.4.
Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [1997] consider another approach. They show that in
several problems of survival analysis, observations are generated according to what they
call a randomized monotone coarsening scheme. They also show that their randomized
scheme generates only distributions that satisfy CAR. In fact, the randomized monotone
coarsening scheme turns out to be a special case of CARgen, although we do not prove
this here. Gill, van der Laan, and Robins show by example that the randomized coars-
ening schemes do not suffice to generate all CAR distributions. We now use essentially
the same example to show that CARgen does not either.
Example 4.8: Consider subcase (ii) of Example 4.6 again. Let U1, U2, U3 and A1, A2 and
A3 be as in that example, and assume for simplicity thatW = A1∪A2∪A3. The example
showed that there exists distributions Pr satisfying CAR in this case with Pr(Ai) > 0
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, all having conditional probabilities Pr(XO = Ui |XW = w) = 1/2 for all
w ∈ Ui. Clearly, U1, U2 and U3 cannot be grouped together to form a set of partitions of
W . So, even though CAR holds for Pr, CARgen cannot be used to simulate Pr.
The problem of finding a natural mechanism that generates all and only distributions
that satisfy CAR seems to be one of the goal of Gill, van der Laan, and Robins’ work
(see, in particular, [1997, Section 3]), although they do not formulate the problem pre-
cisely. While we also do not give a precise formulation of what counts as a reasonable
mechanism (although it can be done in the runs framework—essentially, each step of
the algorithm can depend only on information available to the experimenter, where the
“information” is encoded in the observations made by the experimenter in the course of
running the algorithm), we do give an argument that the mechanism we propose is in
fact reasonable. We call the procedure CARgen∗, since it extends CARgen. Just like
CARgen, CARgen∗ assumes that there is a collection of sensors, and it consults a given
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sensor with a certain predetermined probability. However, unlike CARgen, CARgen∗
may ignore a sensor reading.
Procedure CARgen∗
1. Preparation:
• Fix an arbitrary distribution PW on W .
• Fix a set P of partitions of W , and fix an arbitrary distribution PP on P.
• Choose numbers q ∈ [0, 1) and qU |Π ∈ [0, 1] for each pair (U,Π) such that
Π ∈ P and U ∈ Π satisfying the following constraint, for each w ∈ W such
that PW (w) > 0:
q =
∑
{(U,Π): w∈U,U∈Π}
PP(Π)qU |Π. (4)
2. Generation:
2.1 Choose w ∈ W according to PW .
2.2 Choose Π ∈ P according to PP . Let U be the unique set in Π such that w ∈ U .
2.3 With probability 1 − qU |Π, return (w,U) and halt. With probability qU |Π, go
to step 2.2.
It is easy to see that CARgen is the special case of CARgen∗ where qU |Π = 0 for all
(U,Π). Allowing qU |Π > 0 gives us a little more flexibility. To understand the role of the
constraint (4), note that qU |Π is the probability that the algorithm does not terminate at
step 2.3, given that U and Π are chosen at step 2.2. It follows that the probability qw
that a pair (w,U) is not output at step 2.3 for some U is
qw =
∑
{(U,Π): w∈U,U∈Π}
PP(Π)qU |Π.
Thus, (4) says that the probability qw that a pair whose first component is w is not
output at step 2.3 is the same for all w ∈ W .
CARgen∗ can generate the CAR distribution in Example 4.8, which could not be
generated by CARgen. To see this, using the same notation as in the example, consider
the set of partitions P = {Π1,Π2,Π3} with Πi = {Ui, Ai}. Let PP(Π1) = PP(Π2) =
PP(Π3) = 1/3, qUi|Πi = 0, and qAi|Πi = 1. It is easy to verify that for all w ∈ W , we have
that
∑
{U,Π:w∈U,U∈Π}PP(Π)qU |Π = 1/3, so that the constraint (4) is satisfied. Moreover,
direct calculation shows that, for arbitrary PW , the distribution Pr
∗ on runs generated by
CARgen∗ with this choice of parameters is precisely the unique distribution satisfying
CAR in this case.
So why is CARgen∗ a legitimate mechanism? The key point is that all the relevant
steps in the algorithm can be carried out by an experimenter. The parameters q and
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qU |Π for Π ∈ P and U ∈ Π are chosen before the algorithm begins; this can certainly
be done by an experimenter. Similarly, it is straightforward to check that the equation
(4) holds for each w ∈ W . As for the algorithm itself, the experimenter has no control
over the choice of w; this is chosen by nature according its distribution, PW . However,
the experimenter can perform steps 2.2 and 2.3, that is choosing Π ∈ P according to the
probability distribution PP , and rejecting the observation U with probability qU |Π (since
the experimenter knows both the sensor chosen (i.e., Π) and the observation (U).
The following theorem shows that CARgen∗ does exactly what we want.
Theorem 4.9: Given a set R of runs over a set W of worlds and a set O of observations,
Pr is a distribution on R that satisfies CAR if and only if there is a setting of the
parameters in (step 1 of) CARgen∗ such that, for all w ∈ W and U ∈ O, Pr({r :
XW (r) = w, XO(r) = U}) is the probability that CARgen
∗ returns (w,U).
5 Beyond Observations of Events
5.1 Jeffrey Conditioning
In the previous section, we assumed that the information received is of the form “the
actual world is in U”. But information does not always come in such nice packages. Per-
haps the simplest generalization of this is to assume that there is a partition {U1, . . . , Un}
of W and the agent observes α1U1; . . . ;αnUn, where α1 + · · ·+ · · ·αn = 1. This is to be
interpreted as an observation that leads the agent to believe Uj with probability αj, for
j = 1, . . . , n. According to Jeffrey conditioning, given a distribution PW on W ,
PW (V |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn)
= α1PW (V |U1) + · · ·+ αnPW (V |Un).
Jeffrey conditioning is defined only if αi > 0 implies that PW (Ui) > 0; if αi = 0 and
PW (Ui) = 0, then αiPW (V |Ui) is taken to be 0. Clearly ordinary conditioning is the
special case of Jeffrey conditioning where αi = 1 for some i so, as is standard, we
deliberately use the same notation for updating using Jeffrey conditioning and ordinary
conditioning.
We now want to determine when updating in the naive space using Jeffrey condition-
ing is appropriate. Thus, we assume that the agent’s observations now have the form
of α1U1; . . . ;αnUn for some partition {U1, . . . , Un} of W . (Different observations may,
in general, use different partitions.) Just as we did for the case that observations are
events (Section 3, first paragraph), we once again assume that the agent’s observations
are accurate. What does that mean in the present context? We simply require that,
conditional on making the observation, the probability of Ui really is αi for i = 1, . . . , n.
That is, for i = 1, . . . , n, we have
Pr(XW ∈ Ui |XO = α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) = αi. (5)
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This clearly generalizes the requirement of accuracy given in the case that the observa-
tions are events.
Not surprisingly, there is a generalization of the CAR condition that is needed to
guarantee that Jeffrey conditioning can be applied to the naive space.
Theorem 5.1: Fix a probability Pr on R, a partition {U1, . . . , Un} of W , and probabil-
ities α1, . . . , αn such that α1 + · · · + αn = 1. Let C be the observation α1U1; . . . ;αnUn.
Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) If Pr(XO = C) > 0, then Pr(XW = w |XO = C) = PrW (w |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) for all
w ∈ Ui.
(b) Pr(XO = C |XW = w) = Pr(XO = C |XW ∈ Ui) for all w ∈ Ui such that Pr(XW =
w) > 0.
Part (b) of Theorem 5.1 is analogous to part (c) of Theorem 3.1. There are a number
of conditions equivalent to (b) that we could have stated, similar in spirit to the conditions
in Theorem 3.1. Note that these are even more stringent conditions than are required
for ordinary conditioning to be appropriate.
Examples 3.3 and 4.6 already suggest that there are not too many nontrivial scenarios
where applying Jeffrey conditioning to the naive space is appropriate. However, just as
for the original CAR condition, there do exist special situations in which generalized CAR
is a realistic assumption. For ordinary CAR, we mentioned the CARgen mechanism
(Section 4.5). For Jeffrey conditioning, a similar mechanism may be a realistic model in
some situations where all observations refer to the same partition {U1, . . . , Un} ofW . We
now describe a scenario for such a situation. Suppose O consists of k > 1 observations
C1, . . . , Ck with Ci = αi1U1; . . . ;αinUn such that all αij > 0. Now, fix n (arbitrary)
conditional distributions Prj, j = 1, . . . , n, onW . Intuitively, Prj is PrW (· |Uj). Consider
the following mechanism: first an observation Ci is chosen (according to some distribution
PO on O); then a set Uj is chosen with probability αij (i.e., according to the distribution
induced by Ci); finally, a world w ∈ Uj is chosen according to Prj .
If the observation Ci and world w are generated this way, then the generalized CAR
condition holds, that is, conditioning in the sophisticated space coincides with Jeffrey
conditioning:
Proposition 5.2: Consider a partition {U1, . . . , Un} of W and a set of k > 1 observa-
tions O as above. For every distribution PO on O with PO(Ci) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
there exists a distribution Pr on R such that PO = PrO (i.e. PO is the marginal of Pr on
O) and Pr satisfies the generalized CAR condition (Theorem 5.1(b)) for U1, . . . , Un.
Proposition 5.2 demonstrates that, even though the analogue of the CAR condition
expressed in Theorem 5.1 is hard to satisfy in general, at least if the set {U1, . . . , Un}
is the same for all observations, then for every such set of observations there exist some
priors Pr on R for which the CAR-analogue is satisfied for all observations. As we show
next, for MRE updating, this is no longer the case.
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5.2 Minimum Relative Entropy Updating
What about cases where the constraints are not in the special form where Jeffrey’s
conditioning can be applied? Perhaps the most common approach in this case is to use
MRE. Given a constraint (where a constraint is simply a set of probability distributions—
intuitively, the distributions satisfying the constraint) and a prior distribution PW onW ,
the idea is to pick, among all distributions satisfying the constraint, the one that is
“closest” to the prior distribution, where the “closeness” of P ′W to PW is measured using
relative entropy. The relative entropy between P ′W and PW [Kullback and Leibler 1951;
Cover and Thomas 1991] is defined as
∑
w∈W
P ′W (w) log
(
P ′W (w)
PW (w)
)
.
(The logarithm here is taken to the base 2; if P ′W (w) = 0 then P
′
W (w) log(P
′
W (w)/PW (w))
is taken to be 0. This is reasonable since limx→0 x log(x/c) = 0 if c > 0.) The relative
entropy is finite provided that P ′W is absolutely continuous with respect to PW , in that
if PW (w) = 0, then P
′
W (w) = 0, for all w ∈ W . Otherwise, it is defined to be infinite.
The constraints we consider here are all closed and convex sets of probability mea-
sures. In this case, it is known that there is a unique distribution that satisfies the
constraints and minimizes the relative entropy. Given a nonempty constraint C and a
probability distribution PW on W , let PW (· |C) denote the distribution that minimizes
relative entropy with respect to PW .
If the constraints have the form to which Jeffrey’s Rule is applicable, that is, if they
have the form {P ′W : P
′
W (Ui) = αi, i = 1, . . . , n} for some partition {U1, . . . , Un}, then
it is well known that the distribution that minimizes entropy relative to a prior PW
is PW (· |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) (see, e.g., [Diaconis and Zabell 1986]). Thus, MRE updating
generalizes Jeffrey conditioning (and hence also standard conditioning).
To study MRE updating in our framework, we assume that the observations are
now arbitrary closed convex constraints on the probability measure. Again, we assume
that the observations are accurate in that, conditional on making the observation, the
constraints hold. For now, we focus on the simplest possible case that cannot be han-
dled by Jeffrey updating. In this case, constraints (observations) still have the form
α1U1; . . . ;αnUn, but now the Ui’s do not have to form a partition (they may overlap
and/or not cover W ) and the αi do not have to sum to 1. Such an observation is accu-
rate if it satisfies (5), just as before.
We can now ask the same questions that we asked before about ordinary conditioning
and Jeffrey conditioning in the naive space.
1. Is there an alternative characterization of the conditions under which MRE up-
dating coincides with conditioning in the sophisticated space? That is, are there
analogues of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 5.1 for MRE updating?
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2. Are there combinations of O and W for which it is not even possible that MRE
can coincide with conditioning in the sophisticated space?
With regard to question 1, it is easy to provide a counterexample showing that there
is no obvious analogue to Theorem 5.1 for MRE. There is a constraint C such that the
condition of part (a) of Theorem 5.1 holds for MRE updating whereas part (b) does
not hold. (We omit the details here.) Of course, it is possible that there are some quite
different conditions that characterize when MRE updating coincides with conditioning in
the sophisticated space. However, even if they exist, such conditions may be uninteresting
in that they may hardly ever apply. Indeed, as a partial answer to question 2, we now
introduce a very simple setting in which MRE updating necessarily leads to a result
different from conditioning in the sophisticated space.
Let U1 and U2 be two subsets ofW such that V1 = U1−U2, V2 = U2−U1, V3 = U1∩U2,
and V4 = W − (U1 ∪ U2) are all nonempty. Consider a constraint of the form C =
α1U1;α2U2, where α1, α2 are both in (0, 1). We investigate what happens if we use MRE
updating on C. Since U1 and U2 overlap and do not cover the space, in general Jeffrey
conditioning cannot be applied to update on C. There are some situations where, despite
the overlap, Jeffrey conditioning can essentially be applied. We say that observation
C = α1U1;α2U2 is Jeffrey-like iff, after MRE updating on one of the constraints α1U1 or
α2U2, the other constraint holds as well. That is, C is Jeffrey-like (with respect to PW )
if either PW (U2 |α1U1) = α2 or PW (U1 |α2U2) = α1. Suppose that PW (U2 |α1U1) = α2;
then it is easy to show that PW (· |α1U1) = PW (· |α1U1;α2U2).
Intuitively, if the “closest” distribution P ′W to PW that satisfies P
′
W (U1) = α1 also sat-
isfies P ′W (U2) = α2, then P
′
W is the closest distribution to PW that satisfies the constraint
C = α1U1;α2U2. Note that MRE updating on αU is equivalent to Jeffrey conditioning
on αU ; (1−α)(W −U). Thus, if C is Jeffrey-like, then updating with C is equivalent to
Jeffrey updating.
Theorem 5.3: Given a set R of runs and a set O = {C1, C2} of observations, where
Ci = αi1U1;αi2U2, for i = 1, 2, let Pr be a distribution on R such that Pr(XO = C1),
Pr(XO = C2) > 0, and PrW (w) = Pr(XW = w) > 0 for all w ∈ W . Let Pr
i = Pr(· |XO =
Ci), and let Pr
i
W be the marginal of Pr
i on W . If either C1 or C2 is not Jeffrey-like, then
we cannot have PriW = PrW (· |Ci), for both i = 1, 2.
For fixed U1 and U2, we can identify an observation α1U1;α2U2 with the pair (α1, α2) ∈
(0, 1)2. Under our conditions on U1 and U2, the set of all Jeffrey-like observations is
a subset of 0 (Lebesgue) measure of this set. Thus, the set of observations for which
MRE conditioning corresponds to conditioning in the sophisticated space is a (Lebesgue)
measure 0 set in the space of possible observations. Note however, that this set depends
on the prior PW over W .
A result similar to Theorem 5.3 was proved by Seidenfeld [1986] (and considerably
generalized in [Dawid 2001]). Seidenfeld shows that, under very weak conditions, MRE
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updating cannot coincide with sophisticated conditioning if the observations have the
form “the conditional probability of U given V is α” (as is the case in the Judy Benjamin
problem). Theorem 5.3 shows that this is impossible even for observations of the much
simpler form α1U1;α2U2, unless we can reduce the problem to Jeffrey conditioning (in
which case Theorem 5.1 applies).
6 Discussion
We have studied the circumstances under which ordinary conditioning, Jeffrey condition-
ing, and MRE updating in a naive space can be justified, where “justified” for us means
“agrees with conditioning in the sophisticated space”. The main message of this paper
is that, except for quite special cases, the three methods cannot be justified. Figure 1
summarizes the main insights of this paper in more detail.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the idea of comparing an update rule in a
“naive space” with conditioning in a “sophisticated space” is not new; it appears in
the CAR literature and the MRE literature (as well as in papers such as [Halpern and
Tuttle 1993] and [Dawid and Dickey 1977]). In addition to bringing these two strands of
research together, our own contributions are the following: (a) we show that the CAR
framework can be used as a general tool to clarify many of the well-known paradoxes
of conditional probability; (b) we give a general characterization of CAR in terms of a
binary-valued matrix, showing that in many realistic scenarios, the CAR condition cannot
hold (Theorem 4.4); (c) we define a mechanism CARgen∗ that generates all and only
distributions satisfying CAR (Theorem 4.9); (d) we show that the CAR condition has a
natural extension to cases where Jeffrey conditioning can be applied (Theorem 5.1); and
(e) we show that no CAR-like condition can hold in general for cases where only MRE
(and not Jeffrey) updating can be applied (Theorem 5.3).
Our results suggest that working in the naive space is rather problematic. On the
other hand, as we observed in the introduction, working in the sophisticated space (even
assuming it can be constructed) is problematic too. So what are the alternatives?
For one thing, it is worth observing that MRE updating is not always so bad. In
many successful practical applications, the “constraint” on which to update is of the form
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi = t for some large n, where Xi is the ith outcome of a random variable X on
W . That is, we observe an empirical average of outcomes of X . In such a case, the MRE
distribution is “close” (in the appropriate distance measure) to the distribution we arrive
at by sophisticated conditioning. That is, if Pr′′ = PrW (· |E(X) = t), Pr
′ = Pr(· |XO =<
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi = t〉), and Q
n denotes the n-fold product of a probability distribution Q, then
for sufficiently large n, we have that (Pr′′)n ≈ (Pr′W )
n [van Campenhout and Cover 1981;
Gru¨nwald 2001; Skyrms 1985; Uffink 1996]. Thus, in such cases MRE (almost) coincides
with sophisticated conditioning after all. (See [Dawid 2001] for a discussion of how this
result can be reconciled with the results of Section 5.)
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Figure 1: Conditions under which updating in the naive space coincides with conditioning
in the sophisticated space.
But when this special situation does not apply, it is worth asking whether there
exists an approach for updating in the naive space that can be easily applied in practical
situations, yet leads to better, in some formally provable sense, updated distributions
than the methods we have considered? A very interesting candidate, often informally
applied by human agents, is to simply ignore the available extra information. It turns
out that in many situations this update rule behaves better, in a precise sense, than the
three methods we have considered. This will be explored in future work.
Our discussion here has focused completely on the probabilistic case. However, these
questions also make sense for other representations of uncertainty. Interestingly, in
[Friedman and Halpern 1999], it is shown that AGM-style belief revision [Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985] can be represented in terms of conditioning using a
qualitative representation of uncertainty called a plausibility measure; to do this, the
plausibility measure must satisfy the analogue of Theorem 3.1(a), so that observations
carry no more information than the fact that they are true. No CAR-like condition is
given to guarantee that this condition holds for plausibility measures though. It would
be interesting to know if there are analogues to CAR for other representations of uncer-
tainty, such as possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990] or belief functions [Shafer
1976].
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A Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs of all the results in the paper. For convenience, we
restate the results here.
Theorem 3.1: Fix a probability Pr on R and a set U ⊆ W . The following are
equivalent:
(a) If Pr(XO = U) > 0, then Pr(XW = w |XO = U) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ U) for all
w ∈ U .
(b) The event XW = w is independent of the event XO = U given XW ∈ U , for all
w ∈ U .
(c) Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = Pr(XO = U |XW ∈ U) for all w ∈ U such that Pr(XW =
w) > 0.
(d) Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = Pr(XO = U |XW = w
′) for all w,w′ ∈ U such that
Pr(XW = w) > 0 and Pr(XW = w
′) > 0.
Proof: Suppose (a) holds. We want to show that XW = w and XO = U are independent,
for all w ∈ U . Fix w ∈ U . If Pr(XO = U) = 0 then the events are trivially independent.
So suppose that Pr(XO = U) > 0. Clearly
Pr(XW = w |XO = U ∩XW ∈ U) = Pr(XW = w |XO = U)
(since observing U implies that the true world is in U). By part (a),
Pr(XW = w |XO = U) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ U).
Thus,
Pr(XW = w |XU = U ∩XW ∈ U) = Pr(XW = w |XW ∈ U),
showing that XW = w is independent of XO = U , given XW ∈ U .
Next suppose that (b) holds, and w ∈ U is such that Pr(XW = w) > 0. From part
(b) it is immediate that Pr(XO = U |XW = w ∩ XW ∈ U) = Pr(XO = U |XW ∈ U).
Moreover, since w ∈ U , clearly Pr(XO = U |XW = w ∩XW ∈ U) = Pr(XO = U |XW =
w). Part (c) now follows.
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Clearly (d) follows immediately from (c). Thus, it remains to show that (a) follows
from (d). We do this by showing that (d) implies (c) and that (c) implies (a). So
suppose that (d) holds. Suppose that Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = a for all w ∈ U such that
Pr(XW = w) > 0. From the definition of conditional probability
Pr(XO = U |XW ∈ U)
=
∑
{w∈U :Pr(XW=w)>0} Pr(XO = U ∩XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U)
=
∑
{w∈U :Pr(XW=w)>0} Pr(XO = U |XW = w) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U)
=
∑
{w∈U :Pr(XW=w)>0} aPr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U)
= a
Thus, (c) follows from (d).
Finally, to see that (a) follows from (c), suppose that (c) holds. If w ∈ U is such that
Pr(XW = w) = 0, then (a) is immediate, so suppose that Pr(XW = w) > 0. Then, using
(c) and the fact that XO = U ⊆ XW ∈ U , we have that
Pr(XW = w |XO = U)
= Pr(XO = U |XW = w) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XO = U)
= Pr(XO = U |XW ∈ U) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XO = U)
= Pr(XO = U ∩XW ∈ U) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U) Pr(XO = U)
= Pr(XO = U) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U) Pr(XO = U)
= Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ U)
= Pr(X = w |XW ∈ U),
as desired.
Proposition 4.1: The CAR condition holds for all distributions Pr on R if and only
if O consists of pairwise disjoint subsets of W .
Proof: First suppose that the sets in O are pairwise disjoint. Then for each probability
distribution Pr on R, each U ∈ O, and each world w ∈ U such that Pr(XW = w) > 0,
it must be the case that Pr(XO = U |XW = w) = 1. Thus, part (d) of Theorem 3.1
applies.
For the converse, suppose that the sets in O are not pairwise disjoint. Then there
exist sets U, U ′ ∈ O such that both U − U ′ and U ∩ U ′ are nonempty. Let w0 ∈ U ∩ U
′.
Clearly there exists a distribution Pr on R such that Pr(XO = U) > 0, Pr(XO = U
′) > 0,
Pr(XW = w0 |XO = U) = 0,Pr(XW = w0 |XO = U
′) > 0. But then Pr(XW = w0 |XW ∈
U) > 0. Thus
Pr(XW = w0 |XO = U) 6= Pr(XW = w0 |XW ∈ U),
and the CAR condition (part (a) of Theorem 3.1) is violated.
Lemma 4.3: Let R be the set of runs over observations O and worlds W , and let S be
the CARacterizing matrix for O and W .
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(a) Let Pr be any distribution over R and let S ′ be the matrix obtained by deleting from
S all rows corresponding to an atom A with Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0. Define the vector
~γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) by setting γj = Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) if Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0, and
γj = 0 otherwise, for j = 1, . . . , n. If Pr satisfies CAR, then S
′ · ~γT = ~1T .
(b) Let S ′ be a matrix consisting of a subset of the rows of S, and let PW,S′ be the set
of distributions over W with support corresponding to S ′; i.e.,
PW,S′ = {PW |PW (A) > 0 iff A corresponds to a row in S
′}.
If there exists a vector ~γ ≥ ~0 such that S ′ ·~γT = ~1T , then, for all PW ∈ PW,S′, there
exists a distribution Pr over R with PrW = PW (i.e., the marginal of Pr on W is
PW ) such that (a) Pr satisfies CAR and (b) Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) = γj for all j
with Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0.
Proof: For part (a), suppose that Pr is a distribution on R that satisfies CAR. Let k
be the number of rows in S ′, and let αi = Pr(XW ∈ Ai), for i = 1, . . . , k, where Ai is the
atom corresponding to the ith row of S ′. Note that αi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , k. Clearly,∑
{j:Ai⊆Uj}
Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Ai) = 1. (6)
It easily follows from the CAR condition that
Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Ai) = Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj)
for all Ai ⊆ Uj, so (6) is equivalent to∑
{j:Ai⊆Uj}
Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) = 1. (7)
(7) implies that
∑
{j:Ai⊆Uj} γj = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k. Let ~si be the row in S
′ corresponding
to Ai. Since ~si has a 1 as its jth component if Ai ⊆ Uj and a 0 otherwise, it follows that
~si · ~γ
T = 1 and hence S ′ · ~γT = ~1T .
For part (b), let k be the number of rows in S ′, let ~s1, . . . , ~sk be the rows of S
′, and
let A1, . . . , Ak be the corresponding atoms. Fix PW ∈ PW,S, and set αi = PW (Ai) for
i = 1, . . . , k. Let Pr be the unique distribution on R such that
Pr(XW ∈ Ai) = αi, for i = 1, . . . , k,
Pr(XW ∈ A) = 0 if A ∈ A− {A1, . . . , Ak},
Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Ai) =
{
γj if Ai ∈ Uj ,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Note that Pr is indeed a probability distribution on R, since
∑
A∈A Pr(XW ∈ A) = 1,
Pr(XW ∈ Ai) > 0 for i = 1, . . . , k, and, since we are assuming that S
′ · ~γT = ~1T ,
n∑
j=1
Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Ai) = ~si · ~γ
T = 1,
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for i = 1, . . . , k. Clearly PrW = PW . It remains to show that Pr satisfies CAR and that
γj = Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj). Given j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, suppose that there exist atoms
Ai, Ai′ corresponding to rows ~si and ~si′ of S
′ such that Ai, Ai′ ∈ Uj . Then
Pr(XO = Uj|XW ∈ Ai) = Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Ai′) = γj.
It now follows by Theorem 3.1(c) that Pr satisfies the CAR condition for U1, . . . , Un.
Moreover, Theorem 3.1(d), it must be the case that Pr(XO = Uj |XW ∈ Uj) = γj.
The proof of Theorem 4.4 builds on Lemma 4.3 and the following proposition, which
shows that the condition of part (b) of Theorem 4.4 is actually stronger than the condition
of part (a). It is therefore not surprising that it leads to a stronger conclusion.
Proposition A.1: If there exists a subset R of rows of S that is linearly dependent
but not affinely dependent, then for all R-atoms A corresponding to a row in R and all
j∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if A ⊆ Uj∗, there exists a vector ~u that is an affine combination of the
rows in R such that uj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and uj∗ > 0.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a subset R of rows of S that is linearly dependent but
not affinely dependent. Without loss of generality, let ~v1, . . . , ~vk be the rows in R. There
exist λ1, . . . , λk such that κ =
∑k
i=1 λi 6= 0 and
∑k
i=1 λi~vi = 0. We first show that in fact
every row ~v in R is an affine combination of the other rows. Fix some j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Let µj = (λj −
∑k
i=1 λi) = −
∑
i 6=j λi and let µi = λi for i 6= j. Then
∑k
i=1 µi = 0 and
k∑
i=1
µi~vi =
k∑
i=1
λi~vi −
k∑
i=1
λi~vj = −κ~vj .
For i = 1, . . . , k, let µ′i = −µi/κ. Then
∑k
i=1 µ
′
i = 0 and
∑k
i=1 µ
′
i~vi = ~vj. Now if Ai ⊆ Uj∗
for some i = 1, . . . , k and some j∗ = 1, . . . , n, then ~vi has a 1 as its j
∗th component.
Also, ~vi is an affine combination of the rows of R with no negative components, so ~vi is
the desired vector.
Theorem 4.4: Let R be a set of runs over observations O = {U1, . . . , Un} and worlds
W , and let S be the CARacterizing matrix for O and W .
(a) Suppose that there exists a subset R of the rows in S and a vector ~u = (u1, . . . , un)
that is an affine combination of the rows of R such that uj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and uj∗ > 0 for some j
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there is no distribution Pr on R that
satisfies CAR such that Pr(XO = Uj∗) > 0 and Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for each R-atom
A corresponding to a row in R.
(b) If there exists a subset R of the rows of S that is linearly dependent but not affinely
dependent, then there is no distribution Pr on R that satisfies CAR such that
Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for each R-atom A corresponding to a row in R.
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(c) Given a set R consisting of n linearly independent rows of S and a distribution
PW on W such that PW (A) > 0 for all A corresponding to a row in R, there is a
unique distribution PO on O such that if Pr is a distribution on R satisfying CAR
and Pr(XW ∈ A) = PW (A) for each atom A corresponding to a row in R, then
Pr(XO = U) = PO(U).
Proof: For part (a), suppose that R consists of ~v1, . . . , ~vk, corresponding to atoms
A1, . . . , Ak. By assumption, there exist coefficients λ1, . . . , λk such that
∑k
i=1 λi = 0, and
a vector ~u =
∑k
i=1 λi~vi such that every component of ~u is nonnegative. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that Pr satisfies CAR and that αi = Pr(XW ∈ Ai) > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
By Lemma 4.3(a), we have
~u · ~γ =
(
k∑
i=1
λi~vi
)
· ~γ =
k∑
i=1
λi(~vi · ~γ) =
k∑
i=1
λi = 0, (9)
where ~γ is defined as in Lemma 4.3. For j = 1, . . . , n, if Pr(XO = Uj) > 0 then
Pr(XO = Uj ∩ XW ∈ Uj) = Pr(XO = Uj) > 0 and Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0, so γj > 0. By
assumption, all the components of ~u and ~γ are nonnegative. Therefore, if there exists j∗
such that Pr(XO = Uj∗) > 0 and uj∗ > 0, then ~u · ~γ > 0. This contradicts (9), and part
(a) is proved.
For part (b), suppose that there exists a subset R of rows of S that is linearly de-
pendent but not affinely dependent. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that Pr satisfies
CAR and that Pr(XW ∈ A) > 0 for all atoms A corresponding to a row in R. Pick an
atom A∗ corresponding to such a row. By Proposition A.1 and Theorem 4.4(a), we have
that Pr(XO = Uj∗) = 0 for all j
∗ such that A∗ ∈ Uj∗ . But then Pr(XW ∈ A
∗) = 0, and
we have arrived at a contradiction.
For part (c), suppose that R consists of the rows ~v1, . . . , ~vn. Let S
′ be the n × n
submatrix of S consisting of the rows of R. Since these rows are linearly independent, a
standard result of linear algebra says that S ′ is invertible. Let Pr be a distribution on
R satisfying CAR. By Lemma 4.3(a), S ′~γ = ~1T . Thus, ~γ = (S ′)−1~1. For j = 1, . . . , n
we must have γj = βj/Pr(XW ∈ Uj), where βj = Pr(XO = Uj). Given PrW (A) for each
atom A, we can clearly solve for the βj ’s.
Theorem 4.9: Given a set R of runs over a setW of worlds and a set O of observations,
Pr is a distribution on R that satisfies CAR iff there is a setting of the parameters in
CARgen∗ such that, for all w ∈ W and U ∈ O, Pr({r : XW (r) = w, XO(r) = U}) is
the probability that CARgen∗ returns (w,U).
Proof: First we show that if Pr is a probability on R such that, for some setting of
the parameters of CARgen∗, Pr({r : XW (r) = w, XO(r) = U}) is the probability
that CARgen∗ returns (w,U), then Pr satisfies CAR. By Theorem 3.1, it suffices to
show that, for each set U ∈ O and worlds w1, w2 ∈ U such that Pr(XW = w1) >
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0 and Pr(XW = w2) > 0, we have Pr(XO = U |XW = w1) = Pr(XO = U |XW =
w2). So suppose that w1, w2 ∈ U , Pr(XW = w1) > 0, and Pr(XW = w2) > 0. Let
αU =
∑
{Π∈P:U∈Π} PP(Π)(1 − qU |Π). Intuitively, αU is the probability that the algorithm
terminates immediately at step 2.3 with (w,U) conditional on some w ∈ U being chosen
at step 2.1. Notice for future reference that, for all w,
∑
{U :w∈U}
αU =
∑
{(U,Π):U∈Π,w∈U}
PP(Π)(1− qU |Π) = 1− q, (10)
where q is defined by (4). As explained in the main text, for both i = 1, 2, q is the
probability that the algorithm does not terminate at step 2.3 given that wi is chosen in
step 2.1. It easily follows that the probability that (wi, U) is output at step 2.3 is
PW (wi)αU(1 + q + q
2 + · · ·) = PW (wi)αU/(1− q).
Thus, Pr(XW = wi ∩XO = U) = PW (wi)αU/(1− q). Using (10), we have that
Pr(XW = wi) =
∑
{U :wi∈U}
Pr(XW = wi ∩XO = U) =
PW (wi)
1− q
∑
{U :wi∈U}
αU = PW (wi).
Finally, we have that Pr(XO = U |XW = wi) = αU/(1−q), for i = 1, 2. Thus, Pr satisfies
the CAR condition.
For the converse, suppose that Pr satisfies the CAR condition. Let O = {U1, . . . , Un}.
We choose the parameters for CARgen∗ as follows. Set PW (w) = Pr(XW = w) and let
βi = Pr(XO = Ui). Without loss of generality, we assume that βi > 0 (otherwise, take
O′ to consist of those sets that are observed with positive probability, and do the proof
using O′).
For i = 1, . . . , n, let Πi = {Ui, Ui}. Set PP(Πi) = Pr(XO = Ui) = βi and qU i|Πi = 1.
(Thus, the set U i is always rejected, unless U i = Uj .) Since Pr(XW ∈ Uj) ≥ Pr(XO =
Uj) > 0 by assumption, it must be the case that ǫ = min
n
j=1Pr(XW ∈ Uj) > 0. Now set
qUi|Πi = 1− ǫ/Pr(XW ∈ Ui).
We first show that, with these parameter settings, we can choose q such that constraint
(4) is satisfied. Let qw =
∑
{U,Π: w∈U,U∈Π} PP(Π)qU |Π. For each w ∈ W such that PW (w) >
0, we have
qw
=
∑
{U,Π: w∈U,U∈Π} PP(Π)qU |Π
=
∑n
i=1
∑
{U : w∈U,U∈Πi} PP(Πi)qU |Πi
=
∑
{i:w∈Ui} PP(Πi)qUi|Πi +
∑
{i:w∈Ui}
PP(Πi)qU i|Πi.
The last equality follows because Π = {Ui, U i}. Thus, for a fixed i,
∑
{U : w∈U,U∈Πi} PP(Πi)qU |Πi
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is either PP(Πi)qUi|Πi if w ∈ Ui, or PP(Πi)qU i|Πi if w ∈ U i. It follows that
qw
=
∑
{i:w∈Ui} βi(1− ǫ/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)) +
∑
{i:w/∈Ui} βi · 1
=
∑
{i:w∈Ui} Pr(XO = Ui)(1− ǫ/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)) +
∑
{i:w/∈Ui} Pr(XO = Ui)
=
∑n
i=1 Pr(XO = Ui)− ǫ
∑
{i:w∈Ui} Pr(XO = Ui |XW ∈ Ui)
= 1− ǫ
∑
{i:w∈Ui} Pr(XO = Ui |XW = w) [since Pr satisfies CAR]
= 1− ǫ.
Thus, qw = qw′ if PW (w), PW (w
′) > 0, so these parameter settings are appropriate for
CARgen∗ (taking q = qw for any w such that PW (w) > 0). Moreover, ǫ = 1− q.
We now show that, with these parameter settings, Pr(XW = w ∩ XO = U) is the
probability that CARgen∗ halts with (w,U), for all w ∈ W and U ∈ O. Clearly if
Pr(XW = w) = 0, this is true, since then Pr(XW = w∩XO = U) = 0, and the probability
that CARgen∗ halts with output (w,U) is at most PW (w) = Pr(XW = w) = 0. So
suppose that Pr(XW = w) > 0. Then it suffices to show that Pr(XO = Ui |XW = w) is
the probability that (w,Ui) is output, given that w is chosen at the first step. But the
argument of the first half of the proof shows that this probability is just
αUi
1−q
. But
αUi
1−q
=
αUi
ǫ
[since ǫ = 1− q]
=
∑
{Π∈P:Ui∈Π}
PP (Π)(1−qUi|Π)
ǫ
= βi(ǫ/Pr(XW∈Ui))
ǫ
= Pr(XO = Ui)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)
= Pr(XO = Ui |XW = w) [since Pr satisfies CAR],
as desired.
Theorem 5.1: Fix a probability Pr on R, a partition {U1, . . . , Un} of W , and proba-
bilities α1, . . . , αn such that α1 + · · ·+ αn = 1. Let C be the observation α1U1; . . . ;αnUn.
Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) If Pr(XO = C) > 0, then Pr(XW = w |XO = C) = PrW (w |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) for all
w ∈ Ui.
(b) Pr(XO = C |XW = w) = Pr(XO = C |XW ∈ Ui) for all w ∈ Ui such that Pr(XW =
w) > 0.
Proof: The proof is similar in spirit to that of Theorem 3.1. Suppose that (a) holds,
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w ∈ Ui, and Pr(XW = w) > 0. Then
Pr(XO = C |XW = w)
= Pr(XW = w |XO = C) Pr(XO = C)/Pr(XW = w)
= PrW (w |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) Pr(XO = C)/Pr(XW = w)
= αi PrW (w |Ui) Pr(XO = C)/PrW (w)
= αi Pr(XO = C)/PrW (Ui)
Similarly,
Pr(XO = C |XW ∈ Ui)
= Pr(XW ∈ Ui |XO = C) Pr(XO = C)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)
=
∑
w′∈Ui PrW (w
′ |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) Pr(XO = C)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)
=
∑
w′∈Ui αi PrW (w
′ |Ui) Pr(XO = C)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)
= αi Pr(XO = C)/PrW (Ui)
Thus, Pr(XO = C |XW = w) = Pr(XO = C |XW ∈ Ui) for all w ∈ Ui such that
Pr(XW = w) > 0.
For the converse, suppose that (b) holds and Pr(XO = C) > 0. Given w ∈ Ui, if
Pr(XW = w) = 0, then (a) trivially holds, so suppose that Pr(r(XW = w) > 0. Suppose
that w ∈ Ui. Clearly Pr(w |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) = αi PrW (w |Ui). Now, using (b), we have
that
Pr(XW = w |XO = C)
= Pr(XO = C |XW = w) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XO = C)
= Pr(XO = C |XW ∈ Ui) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XO = C)
= Pr(XW ∈ Ui |XO = C) Pr(XW = w)/Pr(XW ∈ Ui)
= αi PrW (w |Ui) [using (5)].
Thus, (a) holds.
Proposition 5.2: Consider a partition {U1, . . . , Un} of W and a set of k > 1 obser-
vations O = {C1, . . . , Ck} with Ci = αi1U1; . . . ;αinUn such that all αij > 0. For every
distribution PO on O with PO(Ci) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there exists a distribution
Pr on R such that PO = PrO (i.e. PO is the marginal of Pr on O) and Pr satisfies the
generalized CAR condition (part (b) of Theorem 5.1) for U1, . . . , Un.
Proof: Given a setW of worlds, a set O = {C1, . . . , Ck} of observations with distribution
PO satisfying PO(Ci) > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and arbitrary distributions Prj on Uj ,
j = 1, . . . , n, we explicitly construct a prior Pr on R that satisfies CAR such that
PO = PrO, where PrO is the marginal of Pr on O and Prj = PrW (· |Uj).
Given w ∈ Uj , define
Pr({r ∈ R : XO(r) = Ci, XW (r) = w}) = PO(Ci)αijPrj(w).
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(How the probability is split up over all the runs r such that XO(r) = Ci and XW (r) = w
is irrelevant.) It remains to check that Pr is a distribution on R and that it satisfies all
the requirements. It is easy to check that
Pr(XO = Ci) =
n∑
j=1
∑
w∈Uj
PO(Ci)αijPrj(w) = PO(Ci).
It follows that
∑k
i=1 Pr(XO = Ci) = 1, showing that Pr is a probability measure and PO
is the marginal of Pr on O. If w ∈ Uj , then
PrW (w |Uj) = PrW (w)/PrW (Uj)
=
∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij Prj(w)∑
w′∈Uj
∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij Prj(w′)
=
Pr(w)
∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij
(
∑
w′∈Uj
Prj(w′))
∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij
= Prj(w).
Finally, note that, for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all w ∈ Uj such that Pr(XW = w) > 0, we have
that
Pr(XO = Ci |XW = w)
= PrO(Ci)αij Prj(w)∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij Prj(w)
= PrO(Ci)αij∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij
=
PrO(Ci)αij Pr(XW∈Uj)∑k
i=1
PrO(Ci)αij Pr(XW∈Uj)
=
Pr(XO=Ci∩XW∈Uj)
Pr(XW∈Uj)
= Pr(XO = Ci |XW ∈ Uj)
so the generalized CAR condition holds for {U1, . . . , Un}.
To prove Theorem 5.3, we first need some background on minimum relative entropy
distributions. Fix some space W and let U1, . . . , Un be subsets ofW . Let ∆ be the set of
(α1, . . . , αn) for which there exists some distribution PW with PW (Ui) = αi for i = 1, . . . , n
and PW (w) > 0 for all w ∈ W . Now let PW be a distribution with PW (w) > 0 for all
w ∈ W . Given a vector ~β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ R
n, let
P
~β
W (w) =
1
Z
eβ11U1(w)+...+βn1Un(w)PW (w),
where 1U is the indicator function, i.e. 1U(w) = 1 if w ∈ U and 0 otherwise, and
Z =
∑
w∈W e
β11U1(w)+...+βn1Un(w)PW (w) is a normalization factor. Let αi = P
~β
W (Ui) for
i = 1, . . . , n. By [Csisza´r 1975, Theorems 2.1 and 3.1], it follows that
PW (· |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) = P
~β
W ; (11)
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Moreover, for each vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ ∆, there is a vector ~β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ R
n such
that (11) holds. (For an informal and easy derivation of (11), see [Cover and Thomas
1991, Chapter 9].)
Lemma A.2: Let C = α1U1; . . . ;αnUn for some (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ ∆. Let (β1, . . . , βn) be a
vector such that (11) holds for α1, . . . , αn. If βi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
PW (Ui |α1U1; . . . ;αi−1Ui−1;αi+1Ui+1; . . . ;αnUn) = αi.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that β1 = 0. Taking α
′
i = P
~β
W (Ui) for i =
2, . . . , n, it follows from (11) that
PW (w |α
′
2U2; . . . ;α
′
nU
′
n) =
1
Z
eβ21U2+...+βn1UnPW (w),
so that
PW (· |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) = PW (· |α
′
2U2; . . . ;α
′
nUn).
Since PW (Ui |α
′
2U2; . . . ;α
′
nUn) = α
′
i and PW (Ui |α1U1; . . . αnUn) = αi for i = 2, . . . , n, we
have that αi = α
′
i for i = 2, . . . , n. Thus, PW (· |α2U2; . . . ;αnUn) = PW (· |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn)
and, in particular,
α1 = PW (U1 |α1U1; . . . ;αnUn) = PW (U1 |α2U2; . . . ;αnUn).
Theorem 5.3: Given a set R of runs and a set O = {C1, C2} of observations, where
Ci = αi1U1;αi2U2, for i = 1, 2, let Pr be a distribution on R such that Pr(XO = C1),
Pr(XO = C2) > 0, and PrW (w) = Pr(XW = w) > 0 for all w ∈ W . Let Pr
i = Pr(· |XO =
Ci), and let Pr
i
W be the marginal of Pr
i on W . If either C1 or C2 is not Jeffrey-like, then
we cannot have PriW = PrW (· |Ci), for both i = 1, 2.
Proof: Let V1 = U1 − U2, V2 = U2 − U1, V3 = U1 ∩ U2, and V4 = W − (U1 ∪ U2). Since
V1, V2, V3, V4 are all assumed to be nonempty, we have ∆ = (0, 1)
2, where ∆ is defined
as above, that is, ∆ is the set (α1, α2) such that there exists a distribution PW with
PW (U1) = α1, PW (U2) = α2, PW (w) > 0 for all w ∈ W . If Pr
i
W = PrW (· |Ci) for i = 1, 2,
then
λPrW (·|C1) + (1− λ)PrW (· |C2) = PrW , (12)
where λ = Pr(XO = C1). We prove the theorem by showing that (12) cannot hold if
either C1 or C2 is not Jeffrey-like. Since we have assumed that (αi1, αi2) ∈ (0, 1)
2 = ∆
for i = 1, 2, we can apply (11) to Ci for i = 1, 2. Thus, there are vectors (βi1, βi2) ∈ R
2
for i = 1, 2 such that, for all w ∈ W ,
PrW (w|Ci) =
1
Zi
eβi11U1+βi21U2PrW (w). (13)
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(13) implies that PrW (V1|Ci) = Z
−1
i e
βi1 PrW (V1), PrW (V2|Ci) = Z
−1
i e
βi2 PrW (V2), PrW (V3|Ci) =
Z−1i e
βi1+βi2 PrW (V3), PrW (V4|Ci) = Z
−1
i PrW (V4). Plugging this into (12), we obtain the
following four equations:
PrW (V1) = λ
eβ11
Z1
PrW (V1) + (1− λ)
eβ21
Z2
PrW (V1)
PrW (V2) = λ
eβ12
Z1
PrW (V2) + (1− λ)
eβ22
Z2
PrW (V2)
PrW (V3) = λ
eβ11+β21
Z1
PrW (V3) + (1− λ)
eβ21+β22
Z2
PrW (V3)
PrW (V4) = λ
1
Z1
PrW (V4) + (1− λ)
1
Z2
PrW (V4). (14)
Since we have assumed that Pr(w) > 0 for all w ∈ W , it must be the case that PrW (Vi) >
0, for i = 1, . . . , 4. Thus, Pr(Vi) factors out of the ith equation above. By the change of
variables µ = λ/Z1, 1 − µ = (1 − λ)/Z2, ǫij = e
βij − 1 and some rewriting, we see that
(14) is equivalent to
0 = µǫ11 + (1− µ)ǫ21
0 = µǫ12 + (1− µ)ǫ22
0 = µ(ǫ11 + ǫ12 + ǫ11ǫ12) + (1− µ)(ǫ21 + ǫ22 + ǫ21ǫ22). (15)
If, for some i, both ǫi1 and ǫi2 are nonzero, then the three equations of (15) have no
solutions for µ ∈ (0, 1). Equivalently, if for some i, both βi1 and βi2 are nonzero, then
the four equations of (14) have no solutions for λ ∈ (0, 1). So it only remains to show
that for some i, both βi1 and βi2 are nonzero. To see this, note that by assumption for
some i, Ci is not Jeffrey-like. But then it follows from Lemma A.2 above that both βi1
and βi2 are nonzero. Thus, the theorem is proved.
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